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The open business model has attracted much attention from academia and industries 
alike. It implies many new opportunities for product innovatiopn to transend traditional 
boundaries and leaverage diverse capabilities and resources by coherently integrating 
external partners into the design and manufacturing processes. Such trends lead to the 
decentralization of the product fulfillment process. Particularly, the open business model 
offers the opportunities for the small and medium enterprises to fulfill various customer 
needs in an innovative crowdsourcing manner. 
While open design and manufacturing sounds appealing, research on formal 
formulation of crowdsourcing product fulfillment has been very limited. The underlying 
challenge for adoption and reversion of the open business strategy is the difficulty in 
justification of the population dynamics of crowdsourcing. This thesis puts forward 
collaborative-crowdsourcing product fulfillment (C2PF) for open design and 
manufacturing. This work proposes a new product fulfillment workflow to accommodate 
the decentralized yet collaborative product fulfillment process. 
The research focus is geared towards the instantiation of the open design and 
manufacturing with a highly individualized dental braces fulfillment process as a case 
study. The thesis investigates the fundamental issues underpinning open design and 
manufacturing. A game-theoretic decision framework is proposed to deal with such critical 
issues as (1) group decision-making in the product fulfillment processes, (2) dynamics 
analysis of the external partners’ population, and (3) collaboration-negotiation contracting 
scheme based on an information contents measure.  
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Since the boundaries are opened to the external partners, the product fulfillment 
decision-making processes must be reengineered to adapt the collaborative-crowdsourcing 
process. The workflow of C2PF is established. The supply contracting mechanism is 
identified as the key pillars to support the product fulfillment flow. 
In addition, to model the population dynamics of the partners, an evolutionary 
competition-cooperation game theoretic model is established. The relationships among 
participation fraction of the partners, the balance of inter-domain capacity, and income and 
distribution have been established. It reveals a competition-cooperation relationship 
between the external partners and a co-evolutionary characteristic of the entire population. 
This model provides a guideline for the management of the open enterprise, with 
considering of the long-time prosperity. 
Moreover, to achieve the collaborative crowdsourcing, a generalized supply 
contracting evaluation mechanism has been proposed. This mechanism supports the 
collaborative-negotiation from the bidding perspective. The evaluation mechanism handles 
the uncertainty, aggregates multi-criteria evaluation results and ensures the satisfaction of 
the requirements. The proposed theory is applied to the open design and manufacturing, 
respectively. 
Furthermore, a case study of the dental brace product fulfillment process is reported 
to demonstrate the feasibility and potential of the proposed C2PF framework. The case 
study illustrates the roles of the stakeholders through C2PF and shows the steps of the 
execution of the proposed process. This case study serves as a validation of the proposed 
open physical product fulfillment methodology. 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of background knowledge leading to this research 
topic. Through the discussion of research motivation, the topic of research is identified as 
C2PF for open design and manufacturing. It suggests itself as a critical enabler of physical 
product fulfillment under the open business model, which should suggest companies apply 
the open approach in design and manufacturing via collaboratively crowdsourcing. 
Accordingly, the research objectives and scopes are defined, along with a technical 
roadmap of this research. 
1.1 Emerging of Open Business Model 
Manufacturing companies are confronted with challenges for satisfying individual 
customer needs while efficiently managing product variety in order to fulfill product 
development better than their competitors (Brettel et al. , 2014, Jiao et al. , 2003). The 
extent of market-of-one has been foreseen as a prospective driving force for the next 
transformation of the global economy (Pine, 2009). The traditional mass production 
paradigm has been shifted towards mass customization (MC) (Pine, 1993, Tseng et al. , 
1996). Customer involvement in value creation through innovative product fulfillment 
becomes imperative for manufacturers to address customer satisfaction (Koomsap, 2013). 
On the other hand, nowadays information and communications technologies (ICT) 
are undergoing exponential growth. Many disruptive technologies have been advocated for 
manufacturing industries and are continuously emerging, such as cloud computing, Internet 
of Things (IoT), big data analytics, cyber-physical systems (CPS), to name but a few. These 
new technologies are nowadays penetrating manufacturing and serving as critical enablers 
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for the manufacturing industry to address current challenges for customization and quick 
response. For example, the vision of industry 4.0 describes the synergy of IoT and CPS in 
manufacturing environments to make manufacturing systems smarter and more 
autonomous, leading to high agility and flexibility of the production system (Weyer et al. 
, 2015). This trend brings pervasive connectivity to the manufacturing environment and 
allows the collection of a significant amount of real-time information (Monostori et al. , 
2016).  
In such information explosion age, the “Big Data” has been introduced to the industry 
to support the decision-making (Brown et al. , 2011). As a result, the application of the 
“Big Data” can not only excellence the quality of the product design and production, but 
also usher in the socialization product design and the predicting of the supplier’s 
performance (Li et al. , 2015). The emerging cloud computing helps the real-time 
collaboration of various stakeholders and creates intelligent networks for efficient 
fulfillment (Xu, 2012). The smart manufacturing technologies like additive manufacturing 
significantly reshape the realization of the digitalized knowledge (Ratto and Ree, 2012) 
and reorganize the traditional supply chain to the network (Holland et al. , 2017). Thanks 
to the advancement of CAx software, collaborative product fulfillment (CPF) opens the 
access of the group’s simultaneously modification of the digital files and serves the 
organization of distributed knowledge to ensure successful outcomes (Zhen et al. , 2011). 
Because the collaboration across entities can increase the competitiveness of companies, it 
has been recognized as one core characteristic of Industry 4.0 (Schuh et al. , 2014).  
The fusion of these state-of-the-art technologies brings together the ease of 
integration process, which marks the advent of the pervasive increasing willingness of 
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invite external partners to the product and service development (Füller, 2010, Malhotra and 
Majchrzak, 2014). The widespread of such willingness intrigue a growing amount of 
enterprises are choosing the open approach as their entire business model (Kortmann and 
Piller, 2016). This trend of applying open business model (OBM) has been recognized as 
a paradigm shift (Chesbrough, 2006b). By applying OBM, the enterprise can concentrate 
on their core competing activities, while crowdsourcing the peripheral activities to their 
external collaborators. The open design and manufacturing (ODM) is the extension of the 
instantiation of the OBM in manufacturing industries, and the open designer and open 
manufacturers are invited to contribute the product fulfillment.  
Different from traditional outsourcing, crowdsourcing utilizes an open call to a 
crowd for exploring the external resources maximally, instead of an assignment to a 
designated agent (Bücheler and Sieg, 2011). Collaborative-Crowdsourcing is developed as 
the extension of crowdsourcing, which includes a population of heterogeneous workers to 
work complementarily and collaboratively to handle a complex task (Pan et al. , 2016). 
This approach highlights the collaboration among the heterogeneous collaborators to 
ensure the accomplishment of the task, which is essential for the physical product 
fulfillment. Inspired by the collaborative-crowdsourcing, the traditional CPF should be 
reengineered to a C2PF to adopt the open approach in physical products’ design and 
manufacturing.  
1.2 Research Objective  
The traditional product fulfillment flow is an all-in-one and cascading decision-
making process, the integration of the external partners is incompatible with it. In order to 
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implement the ODM, which collaboratively crowdsource the product fulfillment jobs to 
the external partners, several crucial technical issues and corresponding research tasks are 
identified. 
(1) Proposing of the group decision model for C2PF. The proposing model is 
compatible with the collaborative crowdsourcing, which supports the team construction 
under the ODM and negotiation for the group decision making. Corresponding research 
tasks are conducted as follows: 
a. Formulate the workflow along C2PF; 
b. Identify the stakeholders and their roles in C2PF; 
c. Develop the contracting mechanism to support the team construction and 
negotiation. 
(2) Establishment of a dynamics model for the agents’ population to serve the 
decision-making in open enterprise. This model reveals the inherent mechanism of the 
participation and reversion to the ODM and can be taken as a guideline to seek the 
prosperity in a long time span. The related tasks are: 
a. Establish an evolutionary competition-cooperation game model to describe the 
relationships of the agents in open enterprise; 
b. Derive the replicator equations to model the dynamics of the agents’ population; 
c. Analyze the stability of the equilibrium points in the state's space and derive the 
revision protocol as a guideline of the decision-making in open enterprise. 
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(3) Formulation of the supply evaluation mechanism to support the supply 
contracting. The C2PF requires a collaborative team, which is constructed by open call and 
contracting. This contracting mechanism requires a generalized evaluation of the bids 
based on the satisfaction of the requirement and handle the uncertainty. This evaluation 
mechanism is compatible to ODM. The related researching tasks are: 
a. Establish the bids selection methodology; 
b. Formulate the degree of satisfaction as the foundation of the evaluation process; 
c. Instantiate through ODM. 
1.3 Research Scope 
The C2PF is proposed as a new product fulfillment paradigm through design and 
manufacturing of physical products. It attempts to open the boundaries of traditional 
product fulfillment processes to crowdsource the jobs to the collaboration crowds. First, 
the research is motivated by the emergence of OBM which leads to a pervasive willing of 
applying the open business strategy in manufacturing industries. Then, the scope narrows 
down to the formulation of the workflow of the C2PF, the contracting mechanism is 
entailed, and the evaluation has been highlighted. Next, the key to the long-time prosperity 
of the open enterprise is identified as an agents’ population dynamics. An evolutionary 
population dynamics model is established to model the adoption and reversion of the C2PF. 
The third step is the development of a supply contracting evaluation mechanism based on 
the information contents measurement. Such evaluation is a crucial enabler of the 
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collaborative-negotiation contracting with designers and manufacturers. At last, to validate 
the C2PF through ODM, a case study of dental braces fulfillment is conducted.  
1.4 Organization of This Thesis 
In this regard, this research proposes the C2PF to achieve open design and 
manufacturing of physical products. Therefore, the fundamental issues are examined in 
Chapter 3. A frame of the workflow of C2PF is established in Chapter 4. An evolutionary 
game theoretic model is developed for the analysis of the population of designers and 
manufacturers in Chapter 5, to seek the prosperity of the open enterprise. The evaluation 
mechanism for the supply contracting is the foundation of the collaborative-negotiation for 
contracting, which is established in chapter 6. The technical threads underlying this thesis 












CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The background leading to the application of the ODM covers five areas, namely 
from open business model to open design and manufacturing (Section 2.1), enablers of 
collaborative crowdsourcing (Section 2.2), game-theoretic decisions in design and 
manufacturing (Section 2.3), and collaborative-negotiation contracting (Section 2.4). A 
framework of reference will be elaborated to point out their relevance and limitation, which 
leads to the significance of this research. 
2.1 From Open Business Model to Open Design and Manufacturing 
OBM is defined as utilizing the external partners’ assets to develop own business 
model (Chesbrough, 2006a). OBM enhances the firm’s efficiency by leveraging external 
resources in value-creating processes and achieving high utilization of not only the firm’s 
key assets but also the external partners’ resources in value capture process (Chesbrough, 
2007). As a later supplementary of the OBM, open innovation (OI) is applied to depict the 
distributive innovation process based on purposively managed flows across the 
organization’s boundaries (Bogers et al. , 2017). OI has been recognized as an opposite of 
the traditional vertical integration model, regarding develops and distributes the products 
by one firm (Chesbrough et al. , 2006). OI horizontally structures a dynamic interaction 
network of various clusters of autonomous firms throughout the innovation process 
(Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). Moreover, from a platform-based view, an increasing amount 
of the industries organize the firms as a central platform structure, the core firm seeks the 
inflow of the external knowledge, while the other firms are surrounding them to outflow 
their knowledge (Gawer and Cusumano, 2014). Among the accesses to the external 
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knowledge, crowdsourcing is highlighted and described as the open innovator broadcasts 
the problem to the crowd and select the best solution, instead of outsourcing a problem to 
a designated agent or solving it internally (Afuah and Tucci, 2012, Howe, 2006). 
Focusing on the context of product fulfillment in open enterprise, the open design 
(OD) and open manufacturing (OM) is introduced to depict the collaboration with the 
external designers and manufacturers crowds through the product design and 
manufacturing processes, respectively (Bauwens, 2009). The conception of OD origins 
from the open source method from the software industry, which has created the legends 
like Linux and Wikipedia (Weber, 2004). OD often entails the collaboration of external 
designers to design the subsystem, which can be integrated by an open architecture 
harmoniously (Vallance et al. , 2001). The practice of OD is enabled by a designer 
community and the internet-based communication technologies, which significantly 
reduce the cost of virtually team structuring and collaboratively operating (Koch and 
Tumer, 2009). However, since the physical products are increasingly data-centric and 
digitalized, the OBM propagates from software development to the fulfillment of tangible 
products (Raasch et al. , 2009). Because of the indispensable role of manufacturing in the 
physical products’ value realization process (Koufteros et al. , 2014), the manufacturing 
process is assessed as a challenge for the implementation of the OBM through physical 
product fulfillment process (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2006). 
Recent studies highlight a series of perspectives to support the collaboration of a 
crowd of manufacturers, which utilizes OM and cloud manufacturing (CM). OM depicts 
an enterprise structure which integrates the knowledge of manufacturing from the 
distributed manufacturer community to support the manufacturing operation (Maurer and 
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Scotchmer, 2006). CM is a new manufacturing paradigm which integrates the network, 
cloud computing and smart manufacturing technologies into the transformation process of 
manufacturing resources and capabilities to the manufacturing services (Zhang et al. , 
2014). Both approaches pave the way for the collaboration of the manufacturer crowds in 
the context of the physical product fulfillment. Thus, with the support of an open-source 
platform, the crowds of designers and manufacturers can be configured as a collaborative 
team to fulfill the physical product (Banerjee et al. , 2015). 
However, with an increasing interest in the OBM and related issues, there is limited 
research shed light on the underlying dynamics of the adoption of the OBM. Several factors 
in this field are highlighted, which includes partner’s anticipation payoffs, value capture 
ability, the prosperity of the collaborator crowds, and coordination inner the open 
enterprise. (Appleyard and Chesbrough, 2017, Brunswicker and Chesbrough, 2018, Van 
de Vrande et al. , 2009). Furthermore, there is still an absence of formulated ODM 
workflow (Bogers, Zobel, 2017). 
2.2 Enablers of Collaborative Crowdsourcing 
For the achievement of C2PF, the coordination of the designer and manufacturer 
crowds requires pervasive connectivity, which is offered by the spread implementation of 
industrial IoT, mobile internet, and smart sensor technologies (Gil et al. , 2016). Thanks to 
the quick advancement and spread of ICT, the technological foundations of the 
decentralized and networked cooperation product fulfillment process are constructed 
(Wulfsberg et al. , 2011).  
Meanwhile, the traditional standalone CAx systems have been developed to support 
the multi-user adoption and CPF (Hao et al. , 2006). This technology trend enables 
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operative profit enhancement and lead time reduction in product design, manufacturing, 
and supply chain management (Chen et al. , 2004, Shen et al. , 2008, Wang et al. , 2009). 
Additionally, by applying cloud-computing technologies, the cloud-based design and 
manufacturing (CBDM) builds up the bridges between the individual design partners while 
offers the opportunities of inter-organizational real-time communication and coordination 
in the design modeling, analysis, optimization, and validation process (Wu et al. , 2013a). 
Because of the support from the cyber platform, the paradigm of CBDM enables the rapid 
finding of the optimal resources allocation among the crowds for various demands and 
smooths the path of the collaboration (Wu et al. , 2013b). Meanwhile, the cloud-based 
manufacturing helps the design team exploiting a set of various and distributed available 
manufacturing resources for efficiency enhancement of the realization of product design 
(Wu et al. , 2015).  
However, the collaboration of C2PF highly depends on the service and 
communication platforms throughout the product fulfillment process (Richardson, 2016). 
The trends of digitization of product design process and smart manufacturing technologies 
enable the implementation of these platforms in the C2PF process (Boisseau et al. , 2018). 
As a result, a massive amount of data will be generated along the whole process, and the 
efficiency of utilizing these data is the critical factor for the success of the C2PF in this big 
data era (LaValle et al. , 2011). In this era, the CPS can be applied to the management of 
the big-data, leverage the interconnectivity of the physical manufacturing equipment, to 
achieve an agile and intelligent manufacturing system (Lee et al. , 2015). This 
technological idea also leads to the conception of “Digital Twin,” which is a seamlessly 
integrated simulation model along the C2PF process to mirror the life of the physical 
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product twin to achieve high competitiveness (Tao et al. , 2017). From a supervisory level, 
this concept can also boost the replacement of the central re-planning process in the 
production system, with an autonomous process of the reconfiguration of product and 
production units (Rosen et al. , 2015). Thus, a simulation model of C2PF can be established, 
and the optimal configuration of the C2PF process can be searched based on the 
performance of the digital twins. The synergy of these cutting-edge technologies consists 
a set of enablers of C2PF. 
2.3 Game-theoretic Decisions in Design and Manufacturing 
Research in decision support for C2PF includes decision-based design, set-based 
reasoning, distributed problem solving and the negotiation mechanism. The decision-based 
design is a perspective that the designer’s decision-making process is bridging the gap from 
idea to reality by finding satisfying solutions (Hazelrigg, 1998, Mistree et al. , 1990). The 
current research about decision-based collaborative design includes the adoption of linear 
programming method to solve the continuous variable problem (Mistree et al. , 1993) and 
discrete method to model the demands (Wassenaar and Chen, 2003). Meanwhile, the set-
based reasoning expands the optimal solution of the parameters from single points to a 
range, to handle the uncertainty (Davin and Modi, 2005). The distributed problem solving 
considered the entire design process to a consolidated problem and solve it by decomposing 
it hierarchically, while minimizing system level inconsistency and maintaining discipline-
level feasibility (Kroo, 1995). Thus, a collaborative product development problem can be 
modeled as a multi-objective optimization to seek a Pareto efficiency with distributed 
constraints satisfaction (Binnekamp et al. , 2006, Petrie, 1996). The negotiation mechanism 
among the agents can be modeled based on the decision-making process considering multi-
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target negotiation protocol, which includes price, lead time and parameters (Ganguly et al. 
, 2008, Lin et al. , 2012, 2014). 
Among these methods, game theory has been highlighted as a solution of 
supporting the decision-making of a decentralized system. The classic game theory focuses 
more on the decision-making of rational individuals under a static setting. The classic game 
theory can be categorized into cooperative game, competitive game and hierarchical game 
(Liu et al. , 2013), and all of these three can be applied to support the decision-making in 
product development (Tang, 2006). In practice, game theory can model an equilibrium to 
support the analysis of the behaviors of the MAS, considering the interactions among the 
agent population (Xiao et al. , 2005). However, the evolutionary game extends this theory 
to the dynamic circumstance. Since the agents who cannot approach a maximum fitness in 
a dynamic environment will be driven out, the evolutionary game can be applied to predict 
the population which is playing a game (Mailath, 1998). Based on the previous decisions 
made by the agents, their fitness will be evaluated based on the payoff, and the population 
will update the proportion of making decisions to reach an evolutionary steady state in a 
long-time scale (Friedman, 1998). The evolutionary stable states formulate the equilibrium 
situation, which means the composition of the population can be restored after the 
disturbance (Smith, 1988). The evolutionary game theory has been recognized as a 
powerful predictor in the analysis of the population dynamics in the decentralized system, 
since the decision from a group with a higher fitness will be selected after a long-time scale 
interaction with agents from other groups (Feng et al. , 2008, Wang et al. , 2011, Zhang et 
al. , 2007). The evolutionary behavior of the agents under dynamic circumstances can be 
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modeled, and the results can be applied as a guideline of the decision examination (Xiao 
and Yu, 2006). 
2.4 Collaborative-Negotiation Contracting 
The mechanism of collaborative-negotiation supply contracting has been studied 
extensively, which can be divided into two streams, included centralized optimization 
(Arntzen et al. , 1995) and distributed problem-solving (Pena-Mora and Wang, 1998). 
Because of the autonomous agents in practice subject to the different set of constraints and 
targets, the distributed problem-solving shows a superiority, where the agents collaborate 
and negotiate dynamically and achieve equilibrium as an overall functionality (Sadeh et al. 
, 2001). The MAS technology is a paradigm for the researching of the organizational 
architecture, decision-making processes and cooperation and coordination mechanism for 
the distributed, knowledge-based, autonomous problem-solving modules (Brenner et al. , 
2012, Gupta et al. , 2001). MAS collects a set of agents to consist an agent population; each 
agent has their perspective and incentives to maximize its utility in a dynamic circumstance 
(Jennings et al. , 1998). The individual agents work independently or interactively and 
cooperatively to solve the problem, and their local goals and objectives can be integrated 
by the negotiation of the supply contracts to achieve the system’s overall goals (Kaihara, 
2001). The MAS can be applied to analyze the supply chain coordination issue considering 
information, material, and financial flow (Dudek and Stadtler, 2005, Gaonkar and 
Viswanadham, 2001, Govindan and Popiuc, 2014). With the combination of evolutionary 
game theory, the coordination mechanism and the behavior of the agents in an evolutionary 
environment can be modeled (Xiao et al. , 2007). 
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The systematical tasks are decomposed into subtasks, and a crowd of the agents can 
bid based on their individual constraints from a communication channel (Jiao et al. , 2006). 
Based on the requirement of the specific subtask, the bids will be evaluated, and the 
incentives will be awarded to the winning contributor (Simula and Ahola, 2014).  
2.5 Chapter Summary 
The topics reviewed in this chapter provide the guidance to solve the fundamental 
issues involved in C2PF in open design and manufacturing in the next chapter. The 
limitations of various topics are explored and  reviewed in this chapter. The proposed 
methodologies and solutions overcome their respective limitations and address a specific 




CHAPTER 3. FUNDAMENTALS OF C2PF 
Recognizing the importance of collaborative crowdsourcing in the ODM, this 
chapter examines the fundamental issues underlying C2PF for the physical products, which 
includes the group decision model for C2PF, evolutionary population dynamics analysis, 
and collaboration-negotiation contracting. Understanding these fundamental issues is 
crucial to this research and thus leads the way of the formulation of the workflow of C2PF 
in the next chapters and the underlying population dynamics model and contracting 
mechanism in the later chapters. 
3.1 From Conventional Fulfillment Flow to C2PF 
In a traditional view, a manufacturer implements a series of activities to develop the 
product, and thus, fulfill the customer needs. This process is depicted as a cascading 
mapping of “what-how” relationship across four domains, which is named as the axiomatic 
design (Suh, 2001). Such design framework includes customer, functional, physical and 
process domain, respectively, and the mapping relationship starts from customer needs 
(CNs) to functional requirements (FRs), to design parameters (DPs), and to process 
variables (PVs), consecutively (Jiao et al. , 2007). Traditionally, the mapping from domain 
to domain is processed centrally.  
However, with the acceptance of the OBM, the open enterprise must cooperate with 
the external partners in different aspects of the product fulfillment process, includes OI, 
OD, and OM. OI is a value-creation strategy, which is defined as a distributed innovation 
process with the management of inter-organizational knowledge flows across the 
boundaries (Chesbrough et al. , 2014). After this term was coined in 2003 (Chesbrough, 
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2003), several modes of OI have been observed from the practices, which differentiate 
from the spectrum of partners and number of phases (Lazzarotti and Manzini, 2009). 
Among these modes, the open innovator has higher partner variety and more open phases, 
besides, the partners are involved in the activities of the product fulfillment process, 
includes the function specification, design, and manufacturing.  
Besides, the application of the open strategy requires the collaboration of external 
partners, which challenges the traditional fulfillment flow management. The partners are 
embedded in an inter-organizational network, and the relationships are contractually tied 
to collaboration for the fulfilling of the knowledge along the flow (Simard and West, 2006). 
The supply contracts can formally formulate the transaction between the stakeholders to 
pursue the coordination of decision-maker and organize them into a supply chain networks 
(Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo, 2004). In the real practice, every organization and entities 
are operating under heterogeneous environment, objectives, and constraints (Swaminathan, 
1996). As a result of collaboration scheme, the entities have to consider the cohort 
behavior, rather than the individual operation, to achieve the general functionality along 
product fulfillment flow and negotiate with the peers to find a compromise solution (Sadeh, 
Hildum, 2001). Such negotiation works involve the supply contracting that coordinates the 
material and knowledge flow, which can be depicted in the agent-based model (Jiao, You, 
2006).  
A house-pillar-foundation diagram is shown in Figure 3.1 to explain the organization 
of an open enterprise, taking C2PF as its essential workflow. The open innovator, open 
designer, and open manufacturer are three pillars of the house of open enterprise. Because 
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of the C2PF forms the relationship between the pillars, it supports three pillars as the base 
of the house.  
 
Figure 3.1 Technical pillars for C2PF  
An illustrative example is introduced to demonstrate the proposing theory. An 
orthodontist fulfills his patients’ order of braces, which are highly individualized and 
required to apply latest technologies and respond rapidly. The orthodontist can plan the 
treatment, which is the translation of the CNs to FRs and can manage the design and 
manufacturing processes. However, the orthodontist lacks the knowledge and resources to 
execute the appliance design and manufacturing. Thus, the orthodontist implements the 
ODM and crowdsources the product fulfillment jobs to the external partners. The 
collaborative network of the autonomous external partners can be viewed as a multi-agent 
system (MAS). The orthodontist plays the role as an open innovator, which is responsible 
for the treatment planning and the final implementation and delivery, the external partners 
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include open designers and open manufacturers, which cooperate as agents. They consist 
the open enterprise, which applies the ODM by applying the C2PF.  
3.2 The Group Decision for C2PF 
The traditional design framework is a series of actions centrally cascading across the 
domains. However, such decision framework is proposed for the traditional enterprise, 
which fulfills the product all-in-one instead of crowdsourcing to the partners. However, 
besides the traditionally open call to invite a global crowd to solve a job, constructing a 
collaborative-crowdsourcing team has been highlighted to ensure the effectiveness from 
the practice perspective (Tazzini et al. , 2013). The job crowdsourcing process constructs 
a collaborative team, which centers around the context of product development. It is 
essential to reengineer the centralized product fulfillment flow to a collaborative group 
decision-making scheme to support the effectiveness of this team. Because the partners in 
the C2PF are working simultaneously, the job distribution, team construction, coordinated 
planning and collaborative group decision-making has been identified as the critical 
challenges for the effectiveness collaborative-crowdsourcing team construction (Li et al. , 
2018, Red et al. , 2013). An ideal C2PF team structure should ensure the achievability of 
product fulfillment, and collaborative group decision-making process to maximize the 
efficiency.  
3.3 Evolutionary Population Dynamics Analysis 
The dynamical partners’ cooperation network is crucial to C2PF, because of the 
inherent openness. Thus, the governance of the networks is critical to the effectiveness of 
the implementation of OBM (Tiwana et al. , 2010). However, the relationship among the 
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community is multi-fold, and the analysis of the crowd dynamics are complicated. The 
physical products fulfillment requires collaboration between designers and manufacturers. 
Besides, after the open call to the crowd, if the agents decide to bid, they will compete with 
their peers for the rewarding from supply contracts. The open enterprise’s fulfillment 
capacity relies on the willingness of the bids from both design and manufacturing domains. 
However, this willingness is based on the operational success of the open enterprise 
and the individual partner’s revenue. Thus, from a long time span, the proportion of making 
bidding decision in the population of designers and manufacturers show a strong co-
evolution. If the bidding decisions can bring an excessive profit, the proportion of bidding 
agents will increase. Otherwise, a decrease will be observed. To sum up, the significance 
of a population dynamics model has identified. Such model should be able to depict the 
adoption and reversion of the ODM in the agent population. The corresponding population 
dynamics analysis can be taken as a critical guideline for the individual decision making 
and the open enterprise management in ODM. 
3.4 Collaborative-Negotiation for Contracting 
Since the partners in C2PF are decentralized and organized in a network, the C2PF 
can be viewed as a supply chain with knowledge and material flow which fulfill the product 
design and manufacturing, respectively. In a dispersed supply chain network, decision-
making of the autonomous partners highly depends on the decisions from other partners 
(Swaminathan et al. , 1998). However, because the crowdsourcing partners operate in 
heterogeneous environments, the negotiation and coordination among the contracting can 
be identified as a dynamic and varying process (Gaonkar and Viswanadham, 2001). To 
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fulfill a customer order, an individual partner has to coordinate with downstream and 
upstream partners via a set of contracts (Jiao, You, 2006). Thus, the negotiation problem 
can be summarized as a multi-contract negotiation problem with a context of product 
fulfillment.  
In the typical supply contracting process, the candidate agents bid with their bids, 
and the selection of awarding partners is based on the evaluation. This evaluation process 
is the foundation of the awarding activities in the contracting, and the preferred agents will 
be involved as collaborative partners to fulfill the product in the open enterprise. A poor 
selection of the agents and bids can give rise to a significant amount of cost (Ahlmann, 
2002, Pahl and Beitz, 2013). Thus, evaluation is the key to the prosperity of the open 
enterprise and evaluation criteria for the design and manufacturing bids should be 
established to serve the open enterprise’s operation. However, neither design nor 
manufacturing evaluation is based on single criterion process, the multi-criteria evaluation 
criteria for the bids should be established.  
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter examines the fundamental issues underlying C2PF for the physical 
products. These issues include the group decision model for C2PF, evolutionary population 
dynamics analysis, and collaboration-negotiation contracting. Their correlations and the 
influence of the C2PF has also been elaborated. Such profound understanding provides us 
a clear direction of the methodologies and solutions in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4. PRODUCT FULFILLMENT THROUGH 
COLLABORATIVE CROWDSOURCING  
Recognizing a paradigm shift to ODM, this chapter proposes a product fulfillment 
workflow through the ODM and explains the fundamental mechanism underlying the 
fulfillment process, which includes the supply contracting mechanism, and evaluation for 
design and manufacturing. Understanding these fundamental issues is crucial to this 
research and thus achieve the product fulfillment in the open enterprise structure.  
4.1 Workflow of Collaborative-Crowdsourcing Product Fulfillment 
The paradigm shift to ODM implies offering the integration path of external 
partners into all activities in the value creation and capture, such as product design and 
manufacturing. With the involvement of the external partners, the product fulfillment is 
achieved based on the collaboration of multi-parties in four physical domains: open product 
innovation domain, C2PF platform, open design domain, and open manufacturing domain. 
The open innovator     has been identified as a stakeholder in open product innovation 
domain, who takes in charge of collecting the CNs, specify the FRs and final product 
delivery. The stakeholder in open design domain has been identified as the design agents 
   , who generate design solutions. The stakeholder in open manufacturing domain is 
manufacturing agents    , who generates the manufacturing plans considering the 
processes capability constraints and resources utilization limitation.  
The C2PF platform is the fourth domain, it is a bridge to the open product 
innovation domain in the front end and the open design and manufacturing domain at the 
back end. It has two virtual fields, includes C2PF management and open supply contracting 
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mechanism. The C2PF management field is responsible for the management of the specs 
in the fulfillment process. The open supply contracting mechanism is responsible for the 
negotiation and contracting with     and    . Two stakeholders are identified as design 
contracting brokers    and manufacturing contracting broker   , who take in charge of 
the open calls, negotiation and contracting with the    and   . 
Based on the roles in the fulfillment workflow, the stakeholders in C2PF can be 
categorized into five agents cluster: open innovator    , design contracting brokers    , 
design agents   , manufacturing contracting brokers   , manufacturing agents   . 
Inspired by the axiomatic design model, the workflow of C2PF through open design 
and manufacturing is shown in Figure 4.1.  
The CNs represents a set of the customer orders, includes the expectations of the 
open enterprise’s products. The CNs are collected and saved as customer orders    by 
   and then translated to the functional domain as FRs.     considers the engineering 
concerns and develops the FRs based on the related technologies. The FRs are saved as 
Figure 4.1 Product fulfillment process in the open design and manufacturing 
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product specs   , after the data processing, the FRs are structured as a Cartesian product 
named function structure: Ϝ =    ×    …, where   ,   ∈ ℕ, depicts a specific functional 
subtask, and will be sent to the   . The function structure is restructured to design request 
for quotation Ϝ  ∈ Ϝ, includes a set of structured   .  
  are the design agents in the open 
design domain, they receive Ϝ , analyze the structured    and response with the design bids 
  
 ,  ∈ ℕ, all the   
  are collected in the bids set   = {  
 ,  
 ,… }. The    receive    and 
evaluate all the   
  based on the corresponding Ϝ . After the bids evaluation finished, the 
   select the preferred bids and send them to the open product innovation domain in the 
design spec set  ∗ =    
 ∗,  
 ∗,…  .  ∗ contains all the selected design bids   
 ∗.  ∗ is 
saved as the design specs    in the product fulfillment flow management. 
Based on the understanding of the manufacturing industry, the    are structured to 
the product structure ∆ =    ×    … , where    ,   ∈ ℕ, depicts a specific manufacturing 
subtask. The structured ∆ depicts the inner relationship of the product, e.g., the asassembly 
structure, and will be sent to the    . ∆  is restructured to manufacturing request for 
quotation ∆  ∈ ∆ , where   ∈ ℕ, includes a set of the manufacturing subtask    , and will be 
sent to the     by    .     receive the Ρ  , analyze the specs and response with 
manufacturing bids   
 ,  ∈ ℕ. All the   
  are collected in the manufacturing bids set   =
{  
 ,  
 ,… }. After the bids evaluation finished, the   select the preferred bids and send 
them to the open product innovation domain in the manufacturing spec set   ∗ =
   
 ∗,  
 ∗,…  .   ∗ contains all selected manufacturing bids   
 ∗.   ∗is saved as the process 
specs    in the product fulfillment flow management. 
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Different to the “cascading” model, the product fulfillment process in open 
enterprise is shown as “zigzagging.” The reason for this changing is the involvement of the 
external partners, and the fulfillment is achieved by the collaboration of all the stakeholders 
in the fulfillment process. However, this kind of collaboration is forged in the form of 
contracting, and the negotiation involves the supply contracting which coordinates the 
product design and the material flow (Jiao, You, 2006, Subramanian et al. , 2009). Thus, 
the product fulfillment process in open enterprise can be characterized as collaborative-
negotiation based product fulfillment process. 
4.2 Supply Contracting Flows 
The contracting in the open enterprise is the agreement of the collaborative 
relationship, which can be decomposed into three activities: 1) request for quotation (RFQ); 
2) bids proposing; 3) contracting. Based on the different role in the contracting mechanism, 
the    can be categorized into design configuration broker Γ , the negotiation broker in 
open design domain includes design agent invitation broker     and design evaluation 
broker    . Based on the applied policy states, the     can be categorized into bidding 
design agents     and non-bidding design agents     . Similarly, the    can be categorized 
into manufacturing configuration broker Γ , and the negotiation broker in manufacturing 
domain includes manufacturing agent invitation broker    and manufacturing evaluation 
broker   . According to the applied policy states, the    can be categorized as bidding 
manufacturing agents    and non-bidding manufacturing agents    . Figure 4.2 and Figure 
4.3 shows the design and manufacturing supply contracting mechanism, respectively. 
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The design supply contracting mechanism receives the function structure  Ϝ and 
delivers the design spec sets  ∗ as the result of negotiation. The collaborative relationship 
with the     is formed with the design supply contracts    . The design configuration 
broker Γ   receives the Ϝ from     and decomposes the Ϝ and restructures     to Ϝ , after 
that, they will be sent to the negotiation brokers. Inner the negotiation brokers in open 
design domain, the design invitation broker    takes in charge of the invitation of    to 
bid and issue the RFQ to them. According to the one-to-one relationship of Ϝ  to the   
 , 
where   ∈ ℕ, each   
  takes in charge of the invitation a cluster of bidding design agents     
for a specific RFQ. Every design agent cluster have a total number of    agents, thus, a 
generic expression of the bidding design agents is     
  . There are also a cluster of    
choose a non-bidding policy, named as     . The index of the non-bidding design agents is 
 ,  ∈ ℕ, and each of them can be expressed as   
  .  
Every bidding design agent     
   proposes a bid, named as   
 
   
. The bids are 













 . All the   
  are 
sent one-to-one to the design evaluation broker   
  . After the evaluation process, the 
preferred design agents    
∗
 are selected from every design agents cluster   , thus, the 





…, it will be sent to the open design domain to award the    
∗
, and design 
configuration broker Γ  . Γ   processes the    , synthesize the    
∗
and their bids to the 
design spec set  ∗ = {  
 ∗,  
 ∗,… }.  ∗ is sent to the open product innovation domain and 




The manufacturing supply contracting mechanism receives the product structure Ρ 
and delivers the manufacturing spec set   ∗ after the negotiation process. Besides, it also 
generates the manufacturing supply contracts, which formulates the collaborative 
relationship with   . The manufacturing configuration broker Γ  receives the ∆ from    
and decomposes the ∆  and restructures     to ∆  , after that, they will be sent to the 
Figure 4.2 Design supply contracting mechanism 
 
Figure 4.3 Manufacturing supply contracting mechanism 
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negotiation brokers. Inner the negotiation brokers in open manufacturing domain, the 
manufacturing invitation broker    manage the invitation of    to bid and issue the RFQ 
to them. According to the one-to-one relationship of Ρ  to the   
 , where   ∈ ℕ, each   
  
takes in charge of the invitation a cluster of bidding manufacturing agents    for a specific 
RFQ. Every manufacturing agent cluster have a total number of    agents, thus, a generic 
expression of the bidding design agents is    
 
. There are also a cluster of    choose a non-
bidding policy, named as    . The index of the non-bidding design agents is  ,  ∈ ℕ, and 
each of them can be expressed as   
  . 
Every bidding manufacturing agent    
 
 proposes a bid, named as   
 
  
. The bids 














bids are sent to the manufacturing evaluation broker   
 . After the evaluation process, the 
preferred manufacturing agent   
∗
 are selected from every manufacturing agents cluster  , 
thus, the contracts are generated subsequently. The manufacturing supply contracts are 




…, it will be sent to the open manufacturing domain to award the 
  
∗
, and manufacturing configuration broker Γ . Γ  processes the    and synthesize the 
  
∗
 and their bids to the process specs set   ∗ =    
 ∗,  
 ∗,…   .    ∗ is sent to the open 
product innovation domain and saved as process specs   . 
4.3 Design Contracting Evaluation 
From the OD perspective, the   
   is the response of the Ϝ , and the selection of 
preferable   
  should base on the evaluation of the variables, which is formulated as having 
the lowest deviation of the   
  to the expected fulfillment. 
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However, there is a subjectiveness lying in the evaluation process, and in practice, 
the experts evaluate based on their heuristic “rule of thumb,” which have been historically 
done on an ad hoc basis (Thurston and Crawford, 1994). Establishing a model of the 
preference of the bids and the decision-making in the evaluation process to serve the 
contracting mechanism is critical to the realization of C2PF. 
Since the evaluation is an interdisciplinary decision-making process, a series of 
trade-offs must be evaluated by knowledge from the various domain (Jiao and Tseng, 
1998). Thus, the adaptability in regarding the multi-discipline and the aggregability of 
these evaluation results is crucial to the evaluation mechanism. 
At last, the goal of evaluating process is the assessment of the product performance, 
which regarding maximizing the customer’s degree of satisfaction (DoS). However, the 
chance of the satisfaction is not deterministic, and the uncertainty comes from the 
customer’s value perceiving and physical tolerance and fluctuation. A performance-based 
evaluation approach are required to handle this uncertainty. 
4.4 Manufacturing Contracting Evaluation 
From the OM perspective, the realization of a product ∆  is restructured to the 
manufacturing jobs Ρ  , and the external manufacturers  
   are reconfigured into a 
production system in the supply contracting    . The evaluation of the bids seeks the 
maximal overlap to the RFQs. This characteristic requires the evaluation should base on 
the performance of the reconfigured system. However, several challenges lie on the 
development of the evaluation process. 
The evaluation of the production system has various variables, which subject to 
change in the later development, such as processes setting, machine, tooling, and routings. 
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A method to able the process these variables, and easy to reconfigure the system has been 
highlighted in the evaluation process.  
On the other hand, the performance of the production system shows strong dynamic 
and stochastic characteristic in the real manufacturing environment, which regarding the 
fluctuation of the throughput time, tolerance and rejection rate. Moreover, these 
fluctuations propagate to the overall performance of the system, which includes cost and 
lead time and throughput. A method to mimic the uncertainty of the performance is critical 
in the development of evaluation mechanism. 
4.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the workflow of C2PF is established. From a traditional product 
fulfillment view of the axiomatic model and combined with the characteristics from ODM, 
the product fulfillment flow is reengineered from cascading to zigzagging. To serve the 
collaborative characteristic of crowdsourcing process, the supply contracting mechanism 
is highlighted and developed. The negotiation process is highlighted as realizing based on 
the evaluation and contracting, and the multi-criteria evaluation criteria are introduced. 
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CHAPTER 5. EVOLUTIONARY COMPETITION-COOPERATION 
GAME MODEL FOR POPULATION DYNAMICS 
From the constructed supply contracting mechanism, the partners in the open 
enterprise are confronting a massive impact of competition. Because of the existence of the 




, only the best performed agent in each cluster can be awarded and 
selected in the    and   . Besides, due to the “zigzagging” product fulfillment flow in the 
open enterprise, the fulfillment process requires the involvement of the multi-parties, thus, 
the prosperity of the open enterprise heavily relies on the participation of all the parties. 
From this view, the relationships between the agents are not only the competition but also 
the cooperation. 
On the one hand, there is an inter-domain cooperation relationship shown between 
    and    , due to the significance of the capacity matching. Because of the bidding 
manufacturing agents    is invited one-to-one by   
 , for the Ρ  the revenue of the design 
agents    is highly related to the number of the   . The    can be only realized in the case 
that the capacity of the manufacturing domain is matched with the capacity of the design 
domain, by manufacturing process. Otherwise, some of the Ρ  will not get any feasible bid. 
The similarly mechanism is also applicable to the revenue analysis of manufacturing agents 
  . 
On the other hand, there are inner-domain cooperation relationships among the    
or    , because of the willing of the participation in one domain is triggered by the 
participation from another domain. The higher number of bidding agents from one domain 
shows an abundant capacity to the counterpart domain. Such richness implies a higher 
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number of generating RFQ, and therefore, a high likely of awarding in the counterpart 
domain. Thus, the agents in design and manufacturing domain need to cooperate with their 
peers to participate the bidding to attract the     to bid, and to achieve the revenue 
maximization. 
Besides, there is a robust co-evolutionary relationship in the entire population of 
   and    in open enterprise. The decision-making process of applying bidding or non-
bidding policy for the agents is actually based on the revenue of their peers at the current 
situation. A higher revenue of bidding induces the agents applying bidding policy high 
likely, and low revenue of bidding will increase the probability of applying non-bidding 
policy. Additionally, the revenue is highly depending on the participation of the other 
domain. This kind of fitness-decreasing behavior can be categorized in the evolutionary 
puzzle and has been considered using the game theory to model it (Roca et al. , 2009). To 
find the equilibrium of the evolutionary dynamic supply contracting mechanism, the 
evolutionary game model is widely applied (Reeves et al. , 2005, Tian et al. , 2014). In this 
study, the system dynamics analysis based on the evolutionary competition-cooperation 
(ECC) game model is applied to find the equilibrium of the agents’ population.  
5.1 Model Development 
The ECC game model is established to imitate the relationship between the agents. 
This model has considered the cooperation, which is the result of capacity matching and 
participation abundant, the competition of the agents’ peers in their domain, and the co-
evolutionary based on the payoff of the states. Based on the evolutionary game theory 
(Roca, Cuesta, 2009), several assumptions have been set to formulate the model. 
Assumption 1: The population of the    and    is large enough. 
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Assumption 2: The variation of the total amounts of the    and    is minimal. 
Assumption 3: The contracts can be formed with every agent in the population. 
Assumption 4: The agents can only select bidding or non-bidding as their states. 
Assumption 5: The capacity of the open design domain and open manufacturing 
domain is matched. 
Based on these assumptions, the model is established as follows. The  ( ) and 
 ( ) are the fraction of the agents who chose bidding strategy in    and   , respectively. 
Which 0 <  ( )< 1 and 0 <  ( )< 1. Based on the capacity matching thinking, the 






From Eq. 5.1, the CUI can be interpreted as the proportion of the  ( ) and  ( ), it 
measures the unbalance of the capacity of different domains.  
The cost structure of the agents is modeled in three parts. The first part is the 
fundamental income of the agents, which can be categorized as design fundamental income 
    and manufacturing fundamental income    . This pair of variables depict the basic 
operation status of the agents. The second part is the bidding cost, which can be categorized 
as design bidding cost     and manufacturing bidding cost    . This pair of the variables 
are modeled based on the cost of generating bids. However, this cost is not only related to 
the fixed cost of making bids, but also the coast resulted from the unbalanced capacity. For 
instance, in the case the  ( ) is high and  ( ) is low, the bidding cost for    is relatively 
high, because the probability of awarding in this case is minimal. Meanwhile, the bidding 
cost of the    is relatively low, because in such case, the probability of awarding is high. 




approximate to positive infinity, and the bidding cost of the    will approximate to    . 
Thus, the variable corrected design bidding cost   
∗ and corrected manufacturing bidding 
cost   




∗ =    ⋅ (1 +   )
  





The third part of the cost structure is the income from the open product fulfillment 
flow. The extra income Π  is the highest extra income the open enterprise can reach, and 
the corrected extra income ∆  is the extra income considering the participation abundant: 
    =   ⋅  ( )⋅  ( ). (5.3) 
To measure the income distribution between the     and    , the distribution 
coefficient   is introduced, which   ⋅ ∆  will be sent to the   , and (1 −  )⋅ ∆  will be 
sent to   .  
5.2 Replicator Equations for Agents’ Population 
The agents    and    make the decision to be bidding or non-bidding states based 
on their information. The states of the     includes {  ,  } , which are design agents 
bidding states and design agents non-bidding states, respectively. Similarly, the states of 
the     include {   ,   } , which are manufacturing agents bidding states and 
manufacturing agents non-bidding states, respectively. Thus, applying the method from 
Daniel Friedman (Friedman, 1991), the state’s space    is yielded as   =
 {  ,   },{  ,   } .   can be expressed by   ( ), ( )  in the square of [0,1] × [0,1]. 
The payoff of the agents in different states can be established in the Table 5.1. 
35 
 
Table 5.1 can determine the fitness of applying a state by measuring the 
corresponding income. Thus, the fitness functions of    and    can be defined as   
  and 
  
  , respectively, where   ∈ {  ,  },  ∈ {   ,   }. The   
  and   
   can be defined in Eq. 




   =  ( )⋅     +  1 −  ( )  ⋅    
  





   =  ( )⋅      +  1 −  ( )  ⋅     
  
   =  ( )⋅      +  1 −  ( )  ⋅     
 (5.5) 
Based on the Eq. 5.4 and 5.5, the average fitness function of    and    is noted as 
     and      , respectively, and is depicted as follows: 
     =  ( )⋅   
   +  1 −  ( )  ⋅   
  , (5.6) 
      =  ( )⋅   
   +  1 −  ( )  ⋅   
  . (5.7) 
The replicator dynamics describes the frequencies of states in a population, and the 
increasing rate of applying a strategy is proportional to its relative fitness (Hofbauer and 
Sigmund, 1998). Thus, the replicator equations are yielded: 
 




   −       =  ( )⋅  1 −  ( )  ⋅    
   −   
   , (5.8) 
Table 5.1 The game payoff matrix of the design and manufacturing agents 
Design Agent    
Manufacturing Agent    
 ( ) Choose Bidding 1 −  ( ) Choose Non-bidding 
        
 ( ) Choose Bidding     =    −   
∗ + ∆  ⋅       =    −   
∗ + ∆  ⋅   
        =    −   
∗ + ∆  ⋅ (1 −  )      =      
1 −  ( ) Choose Non-bidding     =         =     
        =    −   








   −        =  ( )⋅  1 −  ( )  ⋅    
   −   
   . (5.9) 
Substitute the Eq. 5.4 and 5.5, the replicator equations can be simplified to Eq. 5.10. 
 
     
  ( )
  
=  ( )⋅  1 −  ( )  ⋅      −     
  ( )
  
=  ( )⋅  1 −  ( )  ⋅       −      
 (5.10) 
Let the Eq. 5.10 equal to zero, we can find five equilibrium points:    (0,0), 
  (0,1),   (1,0),   (1,1) and the fifth equilibrium point is   ( 
∗, ∗). Where  ∗ and  ∗ 
are: 
 










    (  (1 −  )+    ⋅  )⋅    (  − 1)
  
   ⋅  (1 −  ) 
. (5.11) 
The    is also an equilibrium point when ( 
∗, ∗)∈ [0,1] × [0,1], the constraints 

















  (  − 1)+    (  − 1)
 (   + 4  ⋅  )
2 
. (5.12) 
5.3 Stability Analysis 
The concept of Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) is introduced to observe the 
dynamic behavior of this kind of population (Smith, 1976). In the evolutionary game theory, 
the ESS is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium (NE), and all games played have an ESS as 
an optimal solution (Smith, 1988). The ESS can be interpreted as a stable condition after a 
long time of evolution, and such stability can resist the mutation of small invasion of the 
population (Friedman, 1991). At an ESS condition, the composition of the agents’ 
populations keeps stable and can prevent the turbulence of alternative strategies. 
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5.3.1 Jacobian Matrix 
The population games describe the interactional behaviors among a considerable 
number of anonymous agents; such behaviors are based on the simple rules called revision 
protocol (Sandholm, 2015). Over a long time span, the aggregate behavior can be well 
modeled by the differential equations. Because the proposed evolutionary game is a 2 × 2 
planar system, the stability of the equilibrium points in replicator equations can be analyzed 
by applying the trace-determinant plane analysis of the Jacobian matrix of the replicator 
equations. The Jacobian matrix   of the replicator equations is established in Eq. 5.13. The 
trace and the determinant of   is noted as   and ∆ . The stability of equilibrium points can 
be evaluated by the following criteria (Hirsch et al. , 2012): 
(1) The equilibrium point is ESS when ∆  > 0 and   < 0; 
(2) The equilibrium is unstable when ∆  > 0 and   > 0; 
(3) The equilibrium is saddle when ∆  < 0. 
5.3.2 Equilibrium Points Stability Analysis 




  (1,1) is shown in Table 5.2. From Table 5.2, the    is an ESS, which can be interpreted 
as no agents decide to bid in this population. Although a small fraction of the agents decides 
to bid, the population will maintain the stable situation at (0,0) in a long-time span. The 
equilibrium points    and    are the case that almost all the agents in  
  or    decide for 
bidding, while all the agents in the counterpart cluster choose non-bidding. The stability 
analysis shows these two are saddle points, which can be interpreted as trajectory has both 
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Table 5.2 The stability analysis of the first four equilibrium points 
Equilibrium 
Points 















  ∞ −∞ Saddle Points 
  (1,1)  
2   −   ⋅ Π 0
0 2   − (1 −  )⋅ Π




The fourth equilibrium point can be interpreted as the situation that all the    and 
   apply bidding. Based on the stability analysis criteria, the constraints conditions for 
each stability situation is summarized in the Table 5.3. 
From Table 5.3, it can be observed that the   ’s stability depends on the relationship 
between the bidding cost,     and    , and the extra income distribution, which is 
determined by   and Π . When the bidding cost is smaller than the half of the received extra 
income, the    is a ESS. In that case, most of the agents in population will bid, and thus, 
the prosperous of the open enterprise can be realized. However, in the case that the extra 
income distribution is unbalanced, the    is a saddle point. It will show different trajectory 
directions on this point. In the last case, if the bidding cost is too high or the extra income 
is not enough,    will be unstable. And based on the Eq. (5.12), the fifth equilibrium point 
will not exist. This case should be avoided, because in such case, the only ESS is   , and 
the operation of the open enterprise will not consist. 




Situation   = tr( ) ∆  = det( ) 
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0 <    <
 ⋅ 
 




  − + ESS 
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  + + Unstable 
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In the case of the fifth equilibrium point, where   ( ), ( )  = ( ∗, ∗), the 
Jacobian matrix is shown in Eq. (5.14). 
To simplify the Eq. 5.14, three variables   ,   , and    is introduced in Eq. 5.15.  
 
   
   =    (  − 1)
  
   =     ⋅  (1 −  ) 
   =     (  (1 −  )+    ⋅  )
 (5.15) 
Thus, the ( ∗, ∗) can be simplified to, 
 








  . (5.16) 
Substitute Eq. 5.16 to 5.14, the Jacobian matrix can be simplified to Eq. 5.17, its 








  ⋅   ⋅    +    ⋅ (  − 1)[(  − 1)⋅    ⋅   +    ⋅   ]
(  − 1)  ⋅    ⋅  
−
  ⋅  (   +   
  ⋅  )⋅ (   −   )
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  [2  (  − 1)−    ⋅  ] ⋅ [   ⋅  (  − 1)  +    ⋅   ]
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  +    ⋅   )
   ⋅  
  ⋅   
   (5.19) 
Based on the Eq. 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19, and the existence conditions for the fifth 
equilibrium point    , the stability of     is processed. The     cannot be an ESS or an 
unstable point when ( ∗, ∗)∈ [0,1] × [0,1]. The    is a saddle points when: 
 















  (  − 1)+    (  − 1)
 (   + 4  ⋅  )
2 
    . (5.20) 
Therefore, the operation of the open enterprise can consist in two scenarios: 1) the 
   is an ESS while the    is a saddle point; 2) the    is an ESS while the    is not exist. 
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The first scenario is the case that the only the    and    are the ESS, and the    is existed 
as a saddle point, the constraint condition is as same as Eq. 5.20. To demonstrate this 
scenario, an illustrative phase diagram is shown in the Figure 5.1. In such case, the 
population can reach the   , but a low value of    is the key to enhance the probability of 
reaching   . 
The second scenario is the case that the    and    are ESS, the    is not existed due 
to the unbalance income between    and   . The constraint condition is shown in Eq. 
5.21. In such case, the open enterprise can reach the   . The illustrative phase diagram is 






⎧ 0 <    <
  ⋅  
2
0 <    <
  
 





  (  − 1)+    (  − 1)
 (   + 4  ⋅  )
2 
<    <






Figure 5.1 Phase diagram of scenario 1 
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5.3.3 Managerial Implications  
From the stability analysis of the equilibrium points, the revision protocol of the 
ECC game model shows a strong influence on the dynamics of the agents’ population. 
Because the equity of distribution among the populations, the scenario 1 shows a 
superiority. In scenarios 1,    can be viewed as a peak in a landscape, and the link between 
   to   ,   , and    consist three ridges, while the area from    to    can be viewed as a 
valley. If the states’ space of the agents’ population falls into the valley area, a long-time 
prosperity can be predicted. Thus, manipulate the    can be identified as a critical method 
in open enterprise management. By using the proposing rules and equations, the revision 
protocol of the current conditions can be derived, and a judgement of the long-time 
prosperity can be concluded.  
 
Figure 5.2 Phase diagram of scenario 2 
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5.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the game theoretic population dynamic model for the open 
enterprise has been established. Different from the traditional enterprise, open enterprises 
open the boundaries and expand the all-in-one decision making to group behavior. This 
model offers a way of describing the adoption and reversion of the ODM, considering the 
competition-cooperation relationship through the ODM process. From a management 
views, it is essential to have a dynamics model of the agents’ population to serve the 
predicting and management of the agents’ behavior.  
As a conclusion, a higher income and balanced distribution among the domains will 
encourage the participation of the agent. Therefore, the long-time prosperity of open 
enterprise can be pursued. However, the relationship of the income, distribution balance 
and the growth rates are changing with the participation fraction. In a high participation 
and fraction situation, the requirement of the income and distribution balance is loosed. On 
the other hand, a high income shows a significant influence on the growth rates in the low 
participation fraction. The open enterprise can manage the agents’ behavior by taking the 




CHAPTER 6. SUPPLY CONTRACTING EVALUATION BASED ON 
INFORMATION CONTENT MEASURE  
Recognize the significance of the evaluation of the bids, the challenges of 
evaluating a bid lies in three aspects. Firstly, because of the inherent characteristic of 
collaborative of C2PF, the bids are sets of DPs or PVs at the early stage, a stream of 
uncertainty is inevitable along the C2PF, such as the contextual misunderstanding in the 
design stage and tolerance of manufacturing process (Jiao and Tseng, 1998, Siskos et al. , 
1984). Secondly, the evaluation of the bids has multi-criteria, the decision-making for 
suppliers have to consider various trade-offs from different disciplines, and some of these 
criteria may be conflicting (Ho et al. , 2010). Thirdly, since some of the RFQs are subjective, 
several bids may be feasible on a functional view, some of the bids may show the 
superiority due to its robustness (Suh, 2001).  
A stream of researches has explored the handling of these challenges. The multi-
criteria utility analysis is a mathematical model for evaluating a set of criteria in the 
engineering fields (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1945). This method enhances the 
algorithm-rigorous of the modeling, and thus, the inconvenience of applying it in the 
evaluation of early stage of design has been pointed out (Thurston, 1991). In contrast, the 
fuzzy analysis is capable of representing and manipulating the imprecise inputs based on 
the fuzzy set theory (Ragin et al. , 2006). Besides, fuzzy sets analysis excels in dealing with 
the vague description in the early stage of product development and the uncertainty of the 
development process (Thurston and Carnahan, 1992). Based on the previous work, Jiao 
and Tseng (Jiao and Tseng, 1998) proposed fuzzy ranking methods to evaluate the 
conceptual design under the MC paradigm. Because of the inherent uncertainty, the efforts 
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of the bids is minimizing the deviation of the performance and maximizing the overlap 
with the expectation of the RFQ (Jiao and Tseng, 2004). The multi-attribute utility theory 
offers the aggregation of a bundle of criteria under uncertain conditions to handle the multi-
criteria evaluation problem (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993).  
The uncertainty of the design bid   
  and manufacturing bid   
  is modeled in a 
different way. The major concern of   
  is the flexibility of the DPs to fulfill of the Ϝ . Suh 
formulate the information axiom, which enable the description of the Ϝ  and   
  into the 
design fulfillment range     and system performance range     in the form of probability 
distribution function (PDF) (Suh, 2001). The evaluation of   
  can be processed based on 
calculating the overlap area of the PDF of the      and    .  
The   
  is the bid of the    with a manufacturing planning to fulfill the Ρ . Since 
the selected    will configure a production system, and the Ρ  will be fulfilled along the 
routing, evaluation of the   
  can be based on the performance of the configured production 
system. Discrete-Event Simulation (DES) can be used to imitate the operations of a real-
world agent-based production system by modeling the changes of state variables at a 
discrete set of points in time (Borshchev and Filippov, 2004). The stochastic model of the 
manufacturing system can be established based on the output analysis of the DES 
(Alexopoulos and Seila, 1998). Similar to the evaluation of the   
 , the overlap of the PDF 
of suppling fulfillment range      and production performance range      can be the 
reference of the evaluation. 
6.1 Bids Selection Methodology 
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This research views the evaluation and ranking of the bids as a series of multi-
criteria decision-making problems in the context of C2PF. The problems can be defined as 
evaluating and ranking a set of alternatives with a bunch of criteria, thus, ensure the 
fulfillment of the requirement, regarding FR, DP and with a coordinated quantity and lead 
time. 
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   are the design and 
manufacturing evaluation criteria, respectively. Besides, the    and     are the number of 
criteria in every  Ϝ   and     ,   ,   ∈ ℕ. The performance of bids are measured by the 














Ϝ  ∈ Ϝ ,    
   ∈ Ρ . 
In a multi-criteria evaluation condition, the evaluation result of a bid   
 
   
 can be 



















  . To model the relative importance among the vector, a weighting factor 
is introduced and noted as  , for a   -dimensional vector, ∑   
  
    ≡ 1. The evaluation 




















However, in practice, the DoSs are heterogeneous and correlated per se, and the 
multi-attribute utility theory has been proposed to handle the underlying correlation (Ji et 















  − 1  , (6.2) 
where the         
 
   
  is normalized DoS   
 
   
 with Ϝ , and   is a normalizing 
constant which scale      from 0 to 1.   can be derived from the equation: 
 




If the   is 0, it indicates there is no preference of the attributes, and the Eq. 6.2 is 
equivalent to the Eq. 6.1 (Krishnamurty, 2006). After the evaluation, the results can be 
collected in a finite set with    elements, and the most preferable bid can be selected by 
finding the minimum or the maximum value in the set: 
 max/min  {    (  
 )}     →   
 ∗ ∈   
 . (6.4) 
6.2 Formulation of Degree of Satisfaction 
In Suh’s original formulation of the information contents (Suh, 2001), the PDF of 
the design range is assumed as uniform. However, because of the preference of the 
requirements, a triangular distribution shows the superiority of modeling     and     (Jiao 
and Tseng, 2004). The PDF of the fulfillment preference can be represented as        and 
      , moreover, the upper and lower limit of these requirement is defined as: ∀    ∈
    
  ,   
   , ∀    ∈     
  ,   
   . The PDF of the performance of the bids are represented by 
       and       . The information content  , measures the probability of success of the 
bid,        and        can be defined as: 
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  = log        . (6.5) 
As shown in Figure 6.1, the probability of success for a bid can be defined as 
expected preference function value of the achieved system performance over the range of 
the range of the fulfillment, i.e., 
 




















6.3 Evaluation of Design Bids 
The instantiation of the proposing evaluation and selection methods through open 
design includes design fulfillment range specification, bids collection, performance range 
specification and degree of stratification calculation. 
 
Figure 6.1 Preference function and performance distribution 
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In the OD segment, the RFQ to fulfill Ϝ  is the decomposed function structure, with 
a set of specific FRs, with an amount of    of criteria as the elements, and the utility 
function    
Ϝ        will be specified by the invitation broker   
   at the open call stage. 
   
Ϝ       depicts the preference of the corresponding FR, a higher value implies the most 
preferred DP, while the upper bound    
   and a lower bound    
   implies the acceptable 
range of the system preference. 
The    number of  




and the corresponding design evaluation broker   











 . Based on the understanding of these DPs, the performance of the 
system can be estimated by   
  and specified as    
Ϝ      . Substitute the corresponding 




After that, the DoS will be aggregated by using Eqn. 6.2, and Eqn. 6.3, since then, a total 
DoS of a bid has been generated as an evaluation result:         
 
   
 . The selection of 




will be selected as the optimal   
 ∗. This bid has the biggest overlap to increase the 
possibility of fulfilling the corresponding CNs. Based on this evaluation results, the agents 
who proposed the   
 ∗ can be selected as a preferred agent    
∗
, and the broker will form 
the contract with him as an award. 
6.4 Evaluation of Manufacturing Bids 
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Different from the instantiation of the proposing evaluation and selection methods 
through OD, the    cooperate to fulfill the manufacturing tasks via an internal material 
flow in the reconfigured open enterprise. Thus, the evaluation of the bids can be 
dichotomized into process feasibility assessment and production performance evaluation. 
The feasibility is a binary assessment, ensure the basic fulfillment of the manufacturing 
RFQ ∆  . However, since the fulfillment process of physical products is based on the 
material flow across a variety of manufacturers, the performance of a    will propagate to 
downstream agents, and finally, influence the holistic performance of the open enterprise. 
Despite of the manufacturing feasibility assessment, a set of general performance 
evaluation criteria must be established to select the preferred bids. Such criteria include the 
price, due dates for a specific volume. Besides the lower price is always pursued by 
manufacturing practitioners, the volume and due dates evaluation should consider the 
upstream and downstream manufacturers to achieve a better performance.  
Similar to the instantiation of OD process,    of  
  bids with their bids   
 
  
, as a 
response of the open call ∆   from   











 . These bids are evaluated with an amount of    evaluation criteria and 
their corresponding utility function    
∆       . This utility function depicts the basic 
expectation of the performance of   . The evaluation job is processed by   
  by applying 
Eqn. 6.7, they estimate the bids’ performance    
∆        based on their engineering 




DoS describes the probability of achieving high performance of the configured production 
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systems. Similar to the aggregation method in OD,         
 
  
  can be derived, thus, an 
optimal   
 ∗ and its corresponding proposer will be evaluated as preferred. As the result of 
the evaluation process, the contracts can be formed as an award. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides a systematical design and manufacturing bid evaluation 
process which support the supply contracting in the open enterprise. The evaluation of bids 
is executed based on the overlap of their performance and corresponding fulfillment 
expectation from multi-criteria. The DoS has introduced to formulate this overlap with the 
considering of the uncertainty, and the multi-attribute utility theory has been introduced to 
aggregate the DoS considering the correlations between the criteria. At last, the proposed 
theory has been implemented through ODM. This bid evaluation mechanism evaluates the 
collected bids from the open call and provides the decision support of the awarding of the 




CHAPTER 7. CASE STUDY 
A case study of dental braces through ODM is used to illustrate the proposed theory. 
Through the developing of the fulfillment flow, an evolutionary game theoretic dynamic 
analysis of the partners and the evaluation process, it demonstrates the C2PF through the 
ODM. 
7.1 Problem Context 
The dental braces are the appliance used in orthodontics to align and straighten 
teeth and help position them to improve the patient’s dental health, which involves the 
application of forces to teeth through the appliance. Due to the variety of the patients’ 
intraoral profile, the dental braces are highly individualized. Thanks to the recent 
advancement of ICT, the workflow of the orthodontics has been highly digitized, and a 
typical digital orthodontics workflow can be decomposed to: 
1) Using the intraoral laser scanner to establish the patients’ digital impression 
model, then analyzing and planning the treatment via animation-based software and 
archiving the digitized profile and prescription; 
2) Based on the treatment plan, involving the digital dental labs as the external 
partners to design the customized appliance via CAx software and archiving the digitized 
design files; 
3) Cloud-based connecting to the orthodontic solution providers as the external 
partners to manufacture the appliance; 




Several intraoral scanning systems provide the CAx and cloud integration through 
the product fulfillment, and a community is established (Vandeweghe et al. , 2017). By 
applying ODM, the dentist can act as an   .    open its boundary to crowdsource the jobs 
to the collaborative crowds and insource the knowledge and capacity from digital dental 
labs as     and orthodontic solution provider as    . Thus,     can focus on its core 
competitiveness which is case analysis and treatment planning. These three stakeholders 
consist a typical open enterprise. This perspective paves the way for the implementation of 
the ODM, and the fulfillment jobs can be crowdsourced to the external partners. Thus, the 
C2PF can be achieved. 
7.2 Numerical Analysis of Agents Population Dynamics 
An ECC game model is implemented to explore the agents’ population dynamics 
in the braces fulfillment C2PF processes. From the formulation in Chapter 5, a numerical 
analysis of the dynamics model is executed to demonstrate the proposing theory. The Π  of 
the C2PF is set at 50, which can be interpreted as the profits of the highest profits that a 
C2PF can reach in product fulfillment. The design bidding cost     and manufacturing 
bidding cost     are set to 2 and 3, respectively. This cost can be interpreted as the cost of 
generating the bidding cost. The distribution coefficient   is set to 0.4. This number entails 
the distribution among the designer and manufacturer domains. Substitute these numbers 
into Eq. 5.10, the replicator equations are derived in Eq. 7.1. 
 





















From the stability analysis methods formulated in Section 5.3, the fifth equilibrium 
points    is existed as a saddle points at (0.447,0.447). The phase diagram of this case is 
shown in Figure 7.1. 
From Figure 7.1 and the replicator equations in Eq. 7.1, some managerial 




 ). The valley area is in the right and 
upper corner. If the state falls into that area, the population will converge to    as an ESS. 
This division implicates if the agents’ participation proportion is at the right upper area, 
the corresponding open enterprise will show a long-time prosperity. In contrast, if the 
agents’ participation proportion falls in the left lower area, it shows a convergence to the 
  (0
 ,0 ), which is also an ESS. This trend will lead the open enterprise to an end.  
 
Figure 7.1 Phase diagram of dental braces fulfillment agents’ population 
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Thus, to seek the long-time prosperity, the manipulation of the   ’s position is 
critical in the management of open enterprise. When the participation of the agents is low, 
a low and left    shows its essentiality. It will lead the agents population to   , to achieve 
the long-time prosperity. Such manipulation involves a higher extra income and lower 
bidding costs. However, when the agents show a higher participation, a low and left   is 
less preferred, because a high extra income to the open designer and manufacturer implies 
a lower income to the innovator. Thus, the open enterprise can move the    in a reasonable 
distance.  
Thirdly, from the Figure 7.1, the changing rates of participation states shows low 
values around the equilibrium points and higher value in the middle and the edge area. It 
implies the participation fraction will have higher stability near the equilibrium points. 
From a management perspective, a deviation of the participation paces and    will result 
in a quicker reforming, and an approximation of the    and participation states will lead to 
a stable circumstance. 
7.3 Design Supply Contracting 
As the product fulfillment process depicted in Figure 3.1 and the design supply 
contracting mechanism in Figure 3.2, the orthodontist is the   , who takes in charge of the 
collection of    and    generation. In the case of dental braces, the orthodontic treatment 
of a patient is the   .    collects them by the intraoral scanner as a digital impression model 
and based on   ,    proposes the treatment plan as a   . This    is a series of the FRs, 
specified the expectations for an appliance to fulfill the orthodontic treatment. These FRs 
are sent to virtual domain of C2PF management and saved as the product specs. 
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The FRs has internal hierarchical and precedence relationship, and the functions 
are structured to Ϝ =    ×    …, and sent to the contracting brokers  
 . Inside of the   , 
the Γ  decomposes the Ϝ to Ϝ , where Ϝ  ∈ Ϝ and send it to the   
 , who send the RFQ to 
the crowd as an open call and specify the evaluation criteria to guide the evaluation process. 
In this illustrate case, there is one RFQ Ϝ  about the braces design bids. The basic FRs for 
the bids is the ensuring of the correction effects and the comfortability. Besides, the bids 
should achieve a low price. The FRs and evaluation criteria for the Ϝ , the corresponding 
description and the units is specified in the Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Request for quotation of design bids for dental braces 












The dental braces align and straighten the teeth 
by applying the correctional torque to the teeth 
root. Usually, a higher torque value implies a 
better high correctional effect. Moreover, a 
high torque control for the orthodontic 






The dental braces are implemented in the 
mouth; thus, it contacts the skin directly. The 
thickness describes the maximum distance 
from the braces to the teeth braces. A lower 
thickness implies a higher comfortability. 
   
  
Ϝ  Corner Radius 
Hard materials usually make the braces, and a 
low fillet radius implies a high tingle feeling. 




Mean Time to 
Failure 
(MTTF) 
The dental braces should provide a high-
reliability performance, and a long MTTF 






The dental braces should be competitive on the 
market, a low sales price to the customer 




After the open RFQ Ϝ  has been sent to the crowds, 4  





 }, and 4 design bids are collected by the   















 . In this case, the bids are described in the Table 7.2. 
  
  evaluates these bids based on their DoS. Based on the mechanism established 
in the Chapter 6, the evaluation methods can be decomposed into following steps. Firstly, 
  
  specifies the corresponding range parameters of     and     for every criterion and bid, 
thus the preference function of expected performance and the PDF of achieved 
performance is established. Secondly, using Eq. 6.5 and 6.6, the information contents   can 
be derived. Thirdly, calculating the DoS using Eq. 6.7 and aggregate these DoS using Eq. 
6.2 and 6.3. At last, the preferred bid can be selected by the rule which is depicted in the 
Table 7.2 Dental braces design bids collection 





The metal brace is the traditional dental braces, which is made of 
metal. It has four essential elements, which includes the brackets, 
bonding material, arch wire and ligature elastic. The brackets are 
typically made of the stainless steel and attach to the teeth via 
bonding materials. The archwire is a thin metal wire to ensure the 







The ceramic brace has a similar shape and structure to the 
traditional braces, instead of using the ceramic material to replace 
the metal to make the brackets. The tooth-colored ceramic 
brackets blend into the tooth. Due to the material change, the 





The lingual brace has the same structure to the traditional brace. 
However, it is placed inside of the teeth. This brace provides a 






The clear aligner is a clear plastic-made brace, which looks 
familiar to a mouth-guard. The geometric profile of this brace is 
close to the patients’ digital impression model. Different from 
other braces, the clear aligner is a set of removable braces, and 
the patients replace it periodically.  
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Eq. 6.4. The evaluation process for the illustrative example is demonstrated in the Table 
7.3. After the evaluation, the   
 
 
 shows superiority and it is selected to be   
 ∗. Thus, the 
corresponding bidding design agent   
   will be evaluated as   
∗
 and awarded by the 
supply contract   . This evaluation and contracting results will be sent to the open product 
innovation domain and saved as design specs   . 
7.4 Manufacturing Supply Contracting 
Based on the demonstrated product fulfillment process in Figure 3.1 and the design 
supply contracting mechanism in Figure 3.3, the Γ  receives the ∆ at first and delivers   ∗ 
at last. ∆ contains the DPs of the product and depicts the product structure. In this case, Γ  
receives the design of the braces, and it decompose the manufacturing jobs based on the 
Table 7.3 Evaluation of design bids 
Performance 
Evaluation 













(  ) Corner Radius (  ) 
MTTF  
(    ℎ) 
Estimated Sales Price  
( $) 
   
             
      
             
      
             
      
             
      



















 7  (0,20) 20 0.3  (0.5,0.1) 0.7 30  (90,30) 150 10  (12,1) 18 4  (5.8,0.9) 7.6 
Fulfillment Range 
                                   


















 0.188 0.849 0.111 0.149 0.281 
Weighting 
Factor 
  0.3 0.15 0.05 0.2 0.3 



















understanding of the products. In the current industrial practice, the thermoforming process 
is widely applied in the manufacturing of a clear aligner, which can be decomposed into 1) 
∆  physical model construction; 2) ∆  thermoforming process (Martorelli et al. , 2013). 
The thermoforming is a way of forming clear aligners by heating up the polyurethane resin 
sheet to a pliable state, then pressing the sheet to a cool mold and holding it until 
rigidification (Throne, 2003). A 3D physical model is a part of a mold, contains the details 
of the treatment plan. Thus, two agent innovation brokers   
  and   
  is involved to invite 
the    bidding for the manufacturing jobs. The whole treatment requires a series of braces 
for a gradual adjustment. Based on the understanding of the ∆   and ∆  ,   
   and   
  
proposed the evaluation criteria for the corresponding RFQs. The RFQs are described in 
the Table 7.4.  














After the design of the braces, a physical 3D 
model needs to be constructed to be a part of 
the mold in the thermoforming process. It is a 
mimic of the patient’s intraoral profile. The 
clear aligner requires a series of appliance for 
a progressive alignment. The manufacturing 













The thermoforming of the clear aligner 
requires pressing the heated sheet again the 
cold 3D physical mold and trimming the 
formed part the after it is rigidified. The 
delivered braces should be polished to ensure 









  broadcast the RFQs to the crowds, 2    and 2    decide to bid, 




 }, respectively. 4 bids are collected by   
  and   
  












  . The bids in this case is shown in the Table 7.5. 
Based on the manufacturing bids, the   
  and   
  builds the DES model to evaluate 
them by analyzing the system performance of the reconfigured production system’s digital 
twins. The evaluation process can be decomposed into the following steps. The   
  and 
  
   firstly specify the corresponding range parameters of     , and the corresponding 
preference function of the suppling fulfillment preference       . Subsequently,   
  and 
  
  implement the DES and predict the range parameter of     and PDF of the probability 
Table 7.5 Dental braces manufacturing bids collection 





Computer numerical control (CNC) system is the prevailing technology 
of obtaining the final shape by subtracting material. 5-axis CNC milling 
machine requires the relatively higher involvement of human 
involvement and programming. However, it offers a quicker model 
generating process. CNC based milling process has the relatively proper 






The 3D printing system is an emerging technology, which obtains the 
final shape by adding layer-upon-layer of material. 3D printing is a 
highly automated production process thus a relatively less human is 
required in the process. However, the layer by layer building process 
introduces stair-case effects on the surface profile and dimensionally 






Vacuum forming presses a heated pliable against the 3D physical mold 
by vacuuming out the air between the mold and sheet. Vacuum forming 






Press forming presses a heated pliable against the 3D physical mold by 
vacuuming out the air between the mold and sheet and applying air 
pressure above the sheet. Press forming process can provide complex 
shapes and quicker forming process.  
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of the success of the system performance       . Based on these functions, the DoS of 
these bids are calculated by using Eq. 6.5 – 6.7. Because the evaluation is a multi-criteria 
problem, the evaluation results are aggregated by Eq. 6.2 and 6.3 to get rid of the correlation. 
At last the preferable bid is selected by rule depicted in Eq. 6.4. The evaluation processes 







 shows superiority in ∆  and ∆ , respectively, and will be selected to be the   
 ∗ 
and   
 ∗ . Thus, their manufacturing agents   
   and   





 and awarded by supply contract    . This evaluation 
and contracting results will be sent to the open product innovation domain and saved as the 
  . 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
This case study of dental braces fulfillment process shows an example of the 
implementation of C2PF thorough ODM. It has proofed the proposed workflow can handle 
Table 7.6 Evaluation of manufacturing bids 
Performance 
Evaluation 
















             
      
             
      
             
      











 12  (16,4) 19 1.7  (2.2,0.3) 3 12.4  (13.2,0.4) 14 15.2  (16.5,0.8) 18 
Fulfillment 
Range 
                            










 0.148 0.528 0.358 0.365 
Weighting 
Factor 
  0.4 0.6 0.8 0.2 



















the C2PF of tangible products. The clear aligner requires individualized treatment plan and 
mold. With the involving the external partners, the orthodontist can fulfill the customer 
needs without developing the design and manufacturing capabilities. The proposing 
evaluation mechanism provides an approach to constructing the collaborative-
crowdsourcing team. 
By applying ODM, the orthodontist can focus more on his core competitiveness, 
includes servicing the customers, treatment planning, and appliance implementation. 
Meanwhile, the digital dental labs and orthodontic solution provider can design and 
manufacture the braces without direct contact with the customers. The C2PF offers a bridge 
to link them to fulfill the customer needs complimentarily and ease the application of the 
emerging technologies like clear aligners. Throughout the C2PF, the SME can achieve the 




CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
8.1 Discussions and Conclusions  
The paradigm of ODM implies the opening of the boundary of the traditional 
manufacturing practitioners and the involving of the external partners into the value 
creation and capture process. This paradigm shift challenges the traditional product 
fulfillment flow because of the decentralized and open structure has replaced the all-in-one 
organization. This work focuses on the physical product fulfillment through the ODM. A 
product fulfillment flow named C2PF has been proposed to entail the crowdsourcing 
process and the collaboration in this paradigm. C2PF reengineers the conventional product 
fulfillment process to allow the negotiation and collaboration with external partners.  
From the platform-based view, the open enterprise can be identified as a platform 
to serve the product fulfillment process. The open innovator, open designers, and open 
manufacturers can be identified as the modules. The open contracting mechanism and C2PF 
management offer an interface for the modules. The C2PF provides an embodiment 
architecture for organizing the modules to an enterprise. Various innovators and partners 
can be rapidly reconfigured thanks to the C2PF platform. This research provides the 
opportunities for the companies to utilize external resources while focus on their core 
competitiveness. Specifically, this work paves the way for the SME’s fulfillment of the 
various customer needs. 
For revealing the dynamics of the partners’ population and seeking the open 
enterprise’s long-time prosperity, the ECC game theoretic models has been proposed as a 
guideline of the management of open enterprise and the group decision-making in C2PF. 
The essential of negotiation and collaboration with the external partners have been 
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highlighted in the management of the knowledge and material flow. The supply contracting 
mechanism has been identified as the key to achieve the collaborative-negotiation. The 
contracting mechanism has been proposed, and the generalized evaluation of the preferable 
bids has been developed. Such mechanism shows the effectiveness of handling the 
complexity of the evaluation problems through ODM and reveals the collaborative-
negotiation inside the open enterprise. 
8.2 Limitations 
However, there are several limitations in this work. Firstly, this work only focuses 
on the contracting stage in the collaborative-negotiation process. After, the contracting, the 
coordination of the design and manufacturing in the execution of C2PF need more research. 
Secondly, since the collaborative crowdsourcing use open calls to invite the bidding, the 
intellectual properties protection can be identified as the difficulties in the ODM. The 
decentralized C2PF must protect the intellectual properties not only during the open calls 
but also the operation of the reconfigured production. Thirdly, the current ECC model 
assumes the homogeneous inner the design and manufacturing agents’ populations, 
respectively. It can be applied to model the behaviors of the similar partners. However, 
heterogeneous partners are high-likely to be involved in the C2PF. The current ECC model 
should be developed to handle a higher agent variety. Fourthly, the robustness of the 
generalized evaluation method needs further exploration. 
8.3 Future Work 
Several ideas are elaborated for the potential endeavors in the future. Firstly, set-
based engineering techniques and predictive best matching protocol should be applied to 
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coordinate the design and manufacturing supply chain in the executive phase of C2PF. 
Secondly, the emerging blockchain technologies shed lights on the security of the 
decentralized networks. Applying blockchain to ensure the intellectual property protection 
will be an applicable method through ODM. Thirdly, a general model of income and cost 
formulation should be developed to support the refinement of the current ECC model. 
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